"All Under Heaven as one Family”: Tianxiaist Ideology and the emerging Chinese Great Power Identity by Puranen, Matti




“All Under Heaven as one Family”: 





The rise of China is perhaps the most important development in world politics today. It is 
challenging the very foundations of the liberal international order that the Western great powers 
have created. Yet, as China emerges as an economic and political powerhouse with global 
influence, it is not at all clear what kind of a great power it will become, and what kind of a 
world order it sees as its ideal. Chinese official foreign policy rhetoric on the subject offers only 
vaguely described slogans and concepts. Another approach for studying “China’s mind” is to 
study China’s academic discourse on world politics and foreign relations. In this article, the 
academic debate around the concept of tianxia (天下. in English: all under heaven) is analyzed, 
in order to study the great power identities that China is constructing for itself as it prepares for 
a bigger role in world politics. The article argues that the “tianxia theory” is attempting to 
distance China from “the West” by creating a completely unique civilizational identity for 
China. The tianxiaist narrative argues that, because of its unique character and because of its 
“harmonious” and “worldly” tianxia conception of world politics, China can offer fresh and 
relevant alternatives for the international community. This is not only a concern for political 
philosophers, as the concepts of tianxia theory also seem to be influencing and inspiring the 
foreign policy thinking of the Chinese government. 
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Introduction 
The rise of China is perhaps the most important development in world politics today. It is 
challenging the foundations of the international order the Western great powers have created. 
The rise has recently gained even more momentum as the leading superpower, the United 
States, seems to be backing away from its international commitments and is offering China 
even more responsibility in global affairs. China appears to be ready too – in the words of 
President Xi Jinping: “China [is] moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions 
to mankind” (China Daily, 2018). 
Yet, a saying goes that “China's mind has been left behind of its body”. In other words, 
as China emerges as an economic and political powerhouse with far reaching influence, it is not 
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at all clear what kind of a great power it will become, and what exactly would be its “great 
contributions to mankind”.  
During the early decades of the People’s Republic (1949–1978), the Chinese 
interpretation of Marxism, Maoism, offered a consistent identity, as well as a worldview for 
China. It answered such questions as who the Chinese were (vanguards of the world proletarian 
revolution), who they were against (capitalists, imperialists, and other class enemies), and what 
was their plan for the world was (a world communist utopia). After Maoism was practically 
abandoned in the 1980’s, China projected its energies into developing its economy. Questions 
about its identity could wait, for the time being. 
Now that China is moving into “the center stage”, these kinds of question are surfacing 
again. How can a giant state like China be peacefully incorporated into the international system, 
and what kind of world will China want to create as it emerges as a global rule maker? The 
official Communist Party rhetoric offers only vaguely-described concepts and slogans as 
answers. For going beyond this bold yet hollow rhetoric, this article suggests analyzing Chinese 
academic discussions on world politics as a means for deepening and expanding our 
understanding of official Chinese foreign policy. 
Questions like the ones above are being widely discussed by scholars of world politics in 
China, and it is a growing consensus that China should not rely on Western ideas for analyzing 
the world anymore. Instead, it should develop its own theories and concepts, as it possesses a 
long and illustrious intellectual tradition which goes back thousands of years from which to 
draw inspiration. Thus, during the early 2000’s, a search for a “Chinese theory of world politics” 
intensified. Studying these “new” ideas offers important insights into Chinese conceptions of 
world politics and into the new identities which are being constructed for the rising China. 
These ideas are also not of mere academic, theoretical, or philosophical interest, as they are 
increasingly influencing the official foreign policy imagination of the Chinese government. 
For example, Yan Xuetong’s “Qinghua School” of international relations studies ancient 
Chinese political philosophers such as Xunzi (ca. 310–237 BCE) and Han Feizi (ca. 279–239 
BCE) and applies their ideas on “moral leadership” and the “kingly way of governance” to the 
contemporary world political situation (Yan, 2011). Another important branch of this search is 
the tianxia theory (天下论, tianxia lun) or tianxiaism (天下主义, tianxia zhuyi). Tianxia 
theorists study imperial China’s traditional system of foreign relations, claiming that the current 
international order, which is based on competing national states, should be replaced with some 
kind of world government that would oversee the good of the whole planet. 
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This kind of new thinking is important as, in the strictly controlled academic environment 
of China, it can be seen as an enlargement of the “official” political discourse which is 
dominated by the Communist Party of China. The party controls the broad direction of 
academia, yet the dominant ideas flow back to influence the political leadership in a dualistic, 
two-way relationship. The party, which is shedding its ideological skin, needs the input of 
academic circles as it is forming a new identity and a new outlook for China after communism 
(Mokry, 2018). 
This article will study these academic visions of world politics, focusing on the tianxia 
theory. The discussion around the tianxia theory offers fascinating views into the emerging 
great power identities of the rising China. At a closer look, it resembles a complete ideology – 
rather than a scientific theory – with its own political worldview and a normative program for 
creating a new cosmopolitan world order.  
Interestingly, these tianxiaist ideas seem to be inspiring China’s official foreign policy 
too, at least on the rhetorical level. In addition to analyzing the worldview and the core concepts 
of the tianxiaist ideology, the article attempts to point out how these same ideas are offering 
support for the Chinese government as it constructs its grand narrative of a benign and 
peacefully-rising China with its unique and “worldly” solutions for reforming the international 
order. This connection is briefly examined in the last section. In the article, tianxia theory is 
approached as a form of political rhetoric, following the conceptual framework proposed by 
Quentin Skinner and Michael Freeden.  
 
What is the tianxia theory? 
Tianxia, roughly translated, means “all under heaven”. It points to an ancient Chinese 
conception of the world in which everything – literally all under heaven – was considered to be 
under the authority of the Chinese Emperor, the Son of Heaven (天子, tianzi). According to this 
cosmology, the supreme god, Heaven bestowed a mandate on the emperor to rule the Earth (the 
so-called “Mandate of Heaven”), but only as long as he ruled it righteously.  
Tianxia theorists study this traditional cosmology, and their core claim is that, for most of 
its history, China indeed was the center of a unique, East Asian international order, “the tianxia 
order”. This order was strictly hierarchic and centrally organized, but it was also a 
“harmonious” and loose system, allowing for cultural diversity and autonomy within its 
domain. It was an alternative system for organizing international relations before the Western 
great powers forced their Westphalian order upon the world. According to tianxiaist thinkers, 
studying the principles and institutions of this ancient order might offer a lot of insight for 
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solving the various problems that globalization has intensified: extreme nationalism, 
international terrorism, or global warming, to name just a few (Sheng, 2014). One could briefly 
describe tianxiaism as a Chinese variant of cosmopolitanism. 
Historians, however, debate whether such a unique system ever existed. Without going 
too deeply into the details, a compromise can be made that, at least during some parts of history 
(the early Tang, Ming, and Qing Dynasties), China’s foreign relations were arranged 
hierarchically around a “tributary system” in which the smaller political entities acknowledged 
China’s supremacy (at least rhetorically) and received autonomy and economic benefits in 
return. Even during periods of when China was weak and this was not the case, Chinese 
emperors did still hold an idealistic, Sinocentric cosmology of being the Sons of Heaven, ruling 
all under heaven.1  
This tianxia cosmology – even if at times in contradiction with reality – dominated the 
worldview and philosophy of the Chinese Empire for thousands of years, up until the 19th 
century when the Western great powers arrived with technologically-advanced gunboats and 
forced its downfall. The Western political cosmology differed considerably from tianxia. It was 
based on an idea of equal sovereign nation states which would interact within the international 
system according to certain universal laws and institutions. Competition, diplomacy, trade, and 
war were all integral parts of this Western international system, which was formalized in the 
treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Zheng, 2011). 
During the 19th century, China had to learn the hard way that its worldview of being the 
center of “all under heaven” had been a complete delusion. During these painful years, China 
was forced to accept that, instead of being the center of everything under heaven, it was simply 
another state (国, guo) within the larger system of states (万国, wanguo). The concept of tianxia 
was slowly replaced with the Western concept of the world (世界, shijie). Other new concepts 
such as the nation (民族， minzu), the Chinese (中国人, Zhongguoren), and the people (人民, 
renmin) had to be invented, as in the all-embracing world conception of tianxia there had been 
neither place nor need for such ideas (Zheng, 2011). 
After the revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the Republic of China, China fully 
acknowledged the principles of the Western international order. It set its aims to become a 
“normal” modernized nation state and pushed the old cosmology of tianxia aside. The creation 
of the Communist People’s Republic of China in 1949 seemed to finalize this disengagement 
 
1 For a modern classic that set the stage for studying this ’Chinese world order’, see Fairbank 1968 
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from the imperial past. Indeed, during the reign of Chairman Mao Zedong (1949–1976), all 
traditional thinking was heavily criticized and even physical objects such as statues or buildings 
– most notably perhaps the home of Confucius – were demolished (Paltemaa & Vuori, 2012). 
After the death of Mao in 1976 and the rise in power of the pragmatically oriented Deng 
Xiaoping, China was finally stabilized. Economic reforms were launched and strict Maoism 
was pushed aside, both in practice and in theory; China initiated its search for a new, post-
communist identity. In this process, traditional culture and philosophy were slowly rehabilitated 
and, since the 1990’s, large scale research projects on Confucianism, for example, have been 
heavily funded by the government (Brady, 2012). 
It is against this “traditional learning fever” that we witness the re-emergence of the 
tianxia worldview. This was first mentioned by Sheng Hong in a short but influential article 
From nationalism to tianxiaism (从民族主义到天下主义，Cong minzuzhuyi dao 
tianxiazhuyi) in 1996, but was brought into the mainstream by Zhao Tingyang with his 2005 
book Tianxia system (天下体系:世界制度哲学导论, Tianxia tixi: Shijie zhidu zhexue daolun) 
After the publication of Zhao’s book, the tianxia theory was noted also in the West, and many 
notable sinologists such as William Callahan (2008) and Peter Perdue (2015) have commented 
on it.  
Both Sheng and Zhao suggest that the traditional Chinese tianxia order, with its 
centralized leadership and its hierarchically arranged international relations, would be more 
stable and peaceful than the current “liberal order” of equal and sovereign nation states in 
endless competition against one another. They argue that tianxia was forgotten during the 
decades of Western supremacy, but it is now time to resurrect the concept, for it might just save 
the planet from the enormous challenges of globalization. 
Zhao and Sheng are the main proponents of tianxiaism, but the idea has been commented 
on and developed by many other scholars, such as Ren Xiao, Li Mingming, Bai Tongdong, and 
Xu Jilin. Among these scholars, a vibrant discussion on the possibilities and prospects for the 
tianxia cosmology has emerged. However, strong critics of the concept have also taken part in 
such discussions (Ge, 2015).  
Even though the word that is often used by the discussants is tianxia ‘theory’, one must 
ask if it is indeed an actual theory in the usual understanding of the concept. Tianxia theory 
does not seem to offer a precise framework for explaining how world politics functions in the 
manner of neorealism, for example. It is much more about sharply criticizing Western politics 
and proposing vague schemes for a global federation of some kind. Therefore, tianxia theory 
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can perhaps be better understood as an ideology of tianxiaism, with its philosophical worldview 
and its normative framework for guiding action.  
How then to approach an ideological construct such as tianxiaism? As Quentin Skinner, 
among many others, has pointed out, political theories – as well as political ideas – are not 
pieces of timeless cumulative wisdom. They are arguments in debates, embedded in their 
particular historical and sociopolitical contexts, and they should be studied as such (Skinner, 
2002). This is the case also with theories of world politics, as no universal agreement on the 
nature of world politics exists. What we have instead is different kinds of theories and -isms, 
offering their distinctive interpretations and normative arguments.  
Keeping this in mind, we must ask: why is the ancient concept of tianxia being brought 
forth right now, at this moment in history? What is the historical context, and what are the 
debates in which it is taking part? I would argue that, for the tianxia theory (and for the “Chinese 
theories of world politics” at large), the context is the ongoing change in global great power 
relations: China is rising, and the Western powers are declining – at least comparatively. A rising 
great power will need its own interpretation and narrative of the world, and its own identity: 
where does it come from, and where is it heading? What shall its contribution for the world be? 
We can, thus, define tianxiaism as an ideology that argues for the reform of the 
international order. In this article, a conceptual approach inspired by Michael Freeden is 
applied, to analyze it. According to Freeden, ideologies should be approached by studying the 
main concepts that are in use within them. It is through the definition and arranging in the order 
of its core concepts that an ideology relates itself to other ideologies and to the world (Freeden, 
2003).  
Although the tianxia theorists differ on many accounts, many points of agreement and 
many similar definitions of the concepts also exist. In this article, following Freeden, these areas 
of agreement are studied, in order to identify the main elements of tianxiaism and to recognize 
the essential beliefs and assumptions that make up its worldview. The research data consists of 
monographs, as well as articles in leading Chinese journals, such as World Economy and 
Politics (世界经济与政治, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi), which discuss and develop the tianxia 
theory and its concepts. Using this approach, a rather coherent picture of tianxiaism can be 
constructed.  
One of the central themes that the theorists agree upon is that tianxia, whatever it is, was 
completely different from “the West”. Thus, when explaining tianxia’s merits, critical 
descriptions and narratives of “the West” and its seemingly eternal features constantly emerge. 
The West works as a reflective concept: it is an anti-China, in which all the aspects which are 
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not part of China’s can be stacked. The West is “the other” in which China reflects itself as it 
attempts to create a unique great power identity for itself.  
This is, by no means, a new phenomenon in Chinese thinking. For example, Fei 
Xiaotong’s classic sociological study From the Soil (乡土中国, Xiangtu Zhongguo) specifically 
explained China’s societal idiosyncrasies by comparing them to their Western counterparts. Fei 
argued that Western and Chinese societies operate on completely different principles, and it 
does not make sense to apply Western sociological theories in the Chinese context. One of the 
most important Chinese philosophers of the 20th century, Liang Shuming, claimed in a similar 
fashion that:  
Chinese people will never gain a clear understanding if they only remain within the 
structures of Chinese society; if only they first look to others and then at themselves, 
then they will immediately understand (quoted in Lu & Zhao 2009: 52) 
 
The main premise of Liang’s most important work, Substance of Chinese Culture 
(中国文化要义, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi), was to compare the Chinese and Western 
civilizations and their cultural origins. 
In order to understand tianxiaism, we will thereby first have to take a look at its historical 
narrative of the West. We will then examine how this is “West” is contrasted with tianxia and 
what kind of a great power identity is thus proposed for the rising China. In the last section, 
these ideas are briefly compared to the prevailing foreign policy concepts of Chinese leadership. 
 
West – The civilization of chaos 
According to Zhao Tingyang, it is because of the independent historical and philosophical 
foundations of the West and China that both civilizations developed completely different 
political worldviews, thought systems, and institutional arrangements (Zhao, 2011). The current 
world order was created by the Western great powers according to their own historically 
contingent image and conception of international politics. It is, thereby, not “universal”, and 
nor does it offer the best possible system for organizing international politics. On the contrary, 
it is actually the very source of the global troubles which become more acute every day. 
According to most accounts, the current international order developed after its main 
elements (the sovereignty of national states, diplomacy, etc.) were institutionalized in the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648. The order then spread all over the world, forcing all other political units 
and regional arrangements to accept its logic (Bull & Watson, 1985). Zhao argues that the seed 
of the same system can be found in the city state (polis) system of Ancient Greece. It is in the 
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polis-system that the Western conception of world politics was initially created: a conception 
in which the political world was divided into small units which would compete against one 
another (Zhao, 2016). 
Sheng Hong points out that China was in a similar situation during its “warring states 
period” (475–221 BCE.). It was divided into small independent kingdoms which fought and 
fiercely competed against one another. China, however, managed to unify and pacify the 
warring states in 221 BCE by creating the Chinese Empire, and it has been able to uphold this 
unification until today. The West, on the other hand, has remained in its own “warring states” 
period throughout most of its history and, more dangerously, has forced this “warring states 
logic” upon the rest of the world (Sheng, 1996). 
Because of this historical trajectory, the tianxiaist argument goes, the West is only capable 
of imagining international politics through nation states and their interactions. In the Western 
mind, above the national state there is only the level of “internationalness” (国际, guoji), not 
the world as a whole political unit, like in China’s tianxia. 
The West has never been able to overcome this kind of “dividing conception of politics” 
(Zhao, 2016:). Even such illustrious philosophers as Immanuel Kant have failed to think in 
tianxia-like global terms. Kant’s cosmopolitan vision, as laid out in the book For Perpetual 
Peace (Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf), is only a world federation of nation 
states, and for Zhao, it  was under the influence of Western, narrow minded tradition of world 
politics (Zhao, 2011).  
For the West, the world is simply a geographical concept. It is an arena in which sates can 
draw their borders, compete, and continue their destructive tendencies. Zhao argues that, from 
the Chinese perspective of tianxia, there is a “non-world” (非世界, fei shijie) or a “chaotic 
world” (乱世, luanshi). As a result of this conception of the world, the current international 
order also operates according to a “Hobbesian law of jungle”, and the West is incapable of 
stabilizing it. On the other hand, it does not even want to, as it sees the order and its competitive 
character as natural, and even desirable. The West hopes to correct the flaws of the order by 
making the competition more market-based and civilized, but by leaves the logic of division 
intact (ibid.).  
Zhao offers the United Nations as a case in point. On the surface, it might seem like a 
genuine world institution, but it is merely a forum for the nation states to gain benefits for 
themselves. The interest of the whole world is absent from its scope, and hence it is “an agora 
without its polis” (Zhao, 2009). 
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Zhao (2016) and Li Mingming (2011) both agree that the West has only been able to 
imagine two ways to bring stability to the Westphalian chaos: the first is by setting up a 
hegemony of one great power which will dominate all others. This can be efficient for some 
time, but the hegemon will never have the acceptance of everybody, and mutinies against it will 
always emerge. The hegemony will, sooner or later, end up collapsing back into an all-out war. 
The second way is to set up a “balance of power” between the great powers and their alliances. 
This is also an unstable situation, as it will eventually burst into wars of massive scale. And, 
even during peaceful times, the risk of a great power war is always lingering (Zhao, 2016). The 
Western world order is, thereby, always on the verge of collapse, and the West – because of its 
philosophical roots – is unable to see the core problem 
According to Zhao, the Western institutional arrangement, based on the “warring states 
logic”, is, however, not the only problem, since the Western ethical vision of the world is also 
limited because of its monotheist origins. When Christianity emerged, the Western worldview 
ceased to develop towards a universal happiness between the humans on the Earth. With 
Christianity, Zhao goes on, this utopian society was moved into the afterlife, heaven, but on the 
planet, the mission was set to convert everybody to the one true faith (Zhao, 2011: 33). 
Zhao sees Christianity as an intolerant religion whose main effect is to sharply divide the 
world into the world of Christianity and the world of the pagans. Zhao argues that, even though 
Christianity has lost its influence as a political theory in Western thinking, its legacy of dualist 
“confrontational thinking” has not. It is because of this legacy that the West is constantly 
searching for “others” to suppress or transform into its own image (Zhao, 2011). 
This “confrontational thinking” has, since, taken many different forms. It can be found in 
Carl Schmitt’s concept of “enemy consciousness” and in his metaphor of “politics as warfare”. 
This same attitude also influences Western countries (especially the United States), as they keep 
spreading their “universal values” (Ibid.). Because of the legacy of Christianity and its dualist 
worldview, the West sees its own conception of world politics as the only and universal one. 
The current Western international order is, then, like the Christendom of the old, and every state 
and culture in it must be converted into its “universal” principles, values, and doctrines.  
From these core elements, a sinister image of the West is narrated. According to this 
image, the perils of the international order – wars, conflicts, and competition – are the results 
of Western worldview which is based on divisions and opposites. The West is not able to see 
the whole, and nor can it ever tolerate a diversity of values and beliefs. From the point of view 
of tianxiaism, the perils of the international order, hence, do not originate from a fixed human 
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nature or any other inevitably determined source. They could and should be overcome with a 
new tianxia system.  
Within this narrative, the concept of the West is never problematized or even defined 
clearly. It is taken as a civilizational entity with its essential elements, in the same manner as in 
Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “Clash of Civilizations”. The civilization of the West is filled 
with all the elements that are not part of the Chinese civilization, and this image is then used as 
a mirror for creating the unique alternative order of tianxia. 
 
China – The civilization of peace and harmony 
According to the tianxiaist narrative described above, the Western conception of politics 
developed around nation states and their interactions. The Chinese conception of politics, on 
the contrary, developed from the viewpoint of the whole world as a political unit and the 
Chinese ideal has, since the dawn of history, been that ‘all under heaven’ should be unified and 
pacified.  
Zhao argues that the tianxia conception first emerged during early Zhou-dynasty (1046–
771 BCE), when a loose feudal order – fengjian (封建) – was created. Within this system, the 
Zhou court served as a leading center, and the various feudal states, tribes, and bands accepted 
its central status. The feudal states had a high degree of autonomy in their domestic policies, so 
the Zhou court’s main task was to maintain the stability, peace, and prosperity of the whole 
realm. Zhao argues that this was an ideal situation: instead of constant war and insecurity, the 
whole known world was unified, yet remained a diverse and harmonious whole (Zhao, 2010). 
Sheng Hong offers a different starting point for tianxia. For him, tianxia emerged much 
later, during China’s Han-dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), when the warring states were pacified 
and unified under one emperor (Sheng, 1996). The centralized empire of the Han is clearly 
different from the loose feudal system of the Zhou, but the core idea is the same for both Sheng 
and Zhao: the whole known world was united and considered to be one political unit. The 
competition of sovereign, regional units was seen as a dangerous, unstable anomaly which 
should never again be allowed to re-emerge. 
Tianxiaists argue that, because of this historical tradition, Chinese political thinking 
evolved towards a worldly approach to politics. It valued stability over liberty, peace over war, 
and hierarchy over anarchy. For Zhao, the difference is evident in the etymologies of the 
concepts of politics in both civilizations. The Western concept of ‘politics’ originates from the 
name of the Greek city state, polis, whereas the Chinese word zhengzhi (政治) means 
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‘governance’, more broadly. The main political question for China was, from the beginning, 
how to harmonize and pacify the whole world (Zhao, 2010). 
From the point of view of tianxia cosmology, the collapse of the world into smaller 
competing entities means chaos (乱, luan). Li Mingming has argued, that because of this 
experience, the Chinese have developed a mass-psychological “order complex” which forces 
China to analyze world politics from the point of view of “order”. Peaceful chaos, such as in 
the liberal international order of our day, is not “order” in a Chinese sense, as a kind of “ethical 
order” also has to exist in the world (Li, 2011).  
What does this ethical order mean? Whereas the Western concept for the world is only 
geographical, the Chinese concept of the world, tianxia, consists of three important aspects: 
First, like the Western concept, tianxia also means the geographical world: all under 
heaven and thus all the geographical formations in it. Second, it has a (social) psychological 
meaning. Tianxia included all the people under heaven and, for tianxia to enjoy peace and 
prosperity, all the people needed to acknowledge its legitimacy. For the emperor to obtain his 
mandate to rule all under heaven, it was not enough to simply conquer all the territories through 
warfare. One had to obtain the approval of the world, the so-called “will of the people” (人心, 
renxin) (Zhao, 2016). 
Third, tianxia bears an ethical or political meaning. Tianxia was considered to be an 
ethical order, resembling a big family (天下一家, tianxia yijia). The emperor was thought to be 
like a respected father who was expected to wield his power righteously. Smaller political 
entities were the “children”, which would need to demonstrate their submission, but which 
would also enjoy the security and economic benefits offered by the emperor (Ren, 2014). 
Tianxia was a complete cosmology in which all and everything, humans and nature, had 
their rightful places under the emperor’s protective shadow. Indeed, according to tianxiaism, an 
important element was that there was “no outside” (无外, wuwai). Because tianxia covered 
everything, it could not have clear outer borders, and nor could it leave anyone outside of it. 
Tianxia, therefore, did not have pagans or “others” which it would need to convert or repress 
(Zhao, 2011). Peoples living far away from the center were considered to be “strangers”, but 
not heretics who needed to be conquered or converted. As one traveled further from the center, 
the might of the emperor withered, but there was never a clear outer border (Ren, 2014).  
Tianxia was a hierarchical and relational world order, and the Western concept of 
sovereignty was simply not comprehensible within it. Instead of sovereign units, different kinds 
of relations between the center and the political units around it existed. Some were close and 
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intimate, some friendly, and some more distant (Ren, 2014). Because tianxia was based on 
relations of varying intimacy between the political entities instead of clear-cut borders, 
nationalism was also an unknown concept within it. Nationalism, and all of its curses, arrived 
in China only with the Westerners, and after the collapse of tianxia (Sheng, 1996).  
In a striking contrast to the West, tianxia is also presented as a realm of cultural diversity, 
as it is claimed to have allowed religious, cultural, and ethnic heterodoxy to exist within it. 
Different religions, such as Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and even Christianity were all allowed 
coexist. Tianxia, however, did make a distinction between the civilized center and the barbarian 
people living on the rim. But, according to tianxiaist interpretation, the center never attempted 
to forcibly proselytize the barbarians. Instead of converting them, China believed in a patient 
“transformation” (化, hua) of the barbarians. This meant that, given time, the barbarians would 
witness the cultural supremacy of the center, and would slowly adopt its civilized ways (Ren, 
2014). 
An important element of this transformation is that “one does not go and teach the rites” 
(礼不往教, li bu wang jiao). In general, using force for achieving any needs was considered to 
be shameful, as this meant that the emperor’s virtuous conduct had not been enough (Ren, 
2014). The tianxiaist narrative sets this defensive and morally superior attitude in stark contrast 
with that of the West, with its aggressive tendency of forcing “universal ideas” upon others, and 
most definitely with weapons if necessary. 
Li Mingming has argued that these differences originate from different conceptions of 
human nature. Western civilization sees human nature as evil and power hungry. Thus, the 
Western conception of world politics follows: the world is an anarchic battleground of states 
fighting for power and hegemony. China, on the other hand, has always believed in a gradual 
change: human nature is open and it can be cultivated through proper education and with a 
proper virtuous example. The Chinese conception of world politics is similarly optimistic and 
cooperative in nature (Li, 2011).  
 
Central elements of Tianxiaism 
To sum up the above, the worldview of tianxiaism presents a grand narrative of two 
civilizations, the West and China, which evolved in very different directions during the course 
of history. Both civilizations developed their own philosophies and value systems, as well as 
unique institutional solutions for the political realities surrounding them. The Western solution 
was efficient for some time, but now, during the era of globalization, it has run out of steam. It 
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needs to be replaced with the long-forgotten tianxia solution, which is better suited for the 
globalized world politics of the future. 
According to the tianxiaist argument, China was once the center of its own order which 
was, in many important ways, superior to the current Western order. But, because of its peaceful 
nature, the tianxia order could not resist the “warring state” logic of the West, and it had to 
surrender. After the fall of tianxia, the West was able to force its own world order upon the 
globe (Sheng, 1996). 
The core of this narrative is that, historically, China has not been a great power like the 
others. Similarly, the zero-sum great power competition of the modern world is only a Western 
phenomenon, and a result of regional developments in the West. Already, thousands of years 
ago, China had overcome of this kind of mentality, and instead contemplated politics in worldly 
terms. The traditional Chinese tianxia conception thus superseded the realpolitik logic of world 
politics, and it could be resurrected again for the salvation of the world. 
 
From the comparison of the two civilizations, a table of value concepts can be made: 
 
Table 1. 
China / Tianxia The West 
Stability / Order 
Hierarchy 
Harmony 








Strict division between units 
State 
Individual 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
By such an interpretation of history, tianxiaism attempts to unite modern China with its 
glorious imperial past. The values of tianxiaism can then be understood as values for China’s 
“new” great power identity. It is an identity of a great power that has a unique, peaceful, and 
worldly approach to world politics. It is a great power which strives for stability, yet also 
cherishes harmony and cultural and political diversity within the world. 
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Tianxia, although peaceful and tolerant, did, however, have a center of authority to which 
all the smaller political units had to pledge loyalty and submission. Tianxiaists also generally 
propose that a kind of world institution should be established, but nowhere in the discussion is 
it explicitly stated that China should establish this new center. Yet, it is impossible not to gain 
the impression that the rising China should strive for such a position, because the West is unable 
to see a solution for the troubles of the globalized world. It is the task of China to realize on a 
global scale the harmonious and peaceful order it commanded for millennia. After the long and 
tormentous years of foreign intrusion and inner instability, China is now finally returning to 
reclaim its title as a middle kingdom, Zhongguo (中国).  
 
Tianxiaism and China’s Foreign policy  
At the end, we should briefly return to the original premise of this article; that is, what kind of 
a great power is China going to become, and what kind of a world order is its top leadership 
dreaming of? And how does the study of Chinese academic ideas on world politics, such as 
tianxiaism, help us to decipher the official foreign policy thinking of the Chinese leadership?  
These questions will be discussed in detail elsewhere (Puranen, upcoming) but, to put it 
briefly, the relationship between tianxiaism and China’s official foreign policy line is not 
straightforward yet it is recognizable. The official rhetoric of the Chinese government does not 
apply the exact same wording, and nor does it directly quote any of the tianxia theorists. 
However, many implicit elements of tianxiaism can be found below the surface. Already, during 
the reign of President Hu Jintao (2002–2012), such core foreign policy concepts as the 
“harmonious world” (和谐世界, hexie shijie) and a “new type of great power relationship” 
(新型大国关系，xinxing daguoguo guanxi) were introduced. Both imply a world order in 
which political units and even civilizations would coexist peacefully, respecting each other’s 
unique characters. States, and especially great powers, should focus on building mutual trust 
and “win-win cooperation” and the dangerous, competitive, Cold War mentality should be set 
aside (Keith, 2012). 
During the tenure of President Xi Jinping (2012 onwards) the general tone of Chinese 
foreign policy rhetoric has become more assertive and confident. A turn from “the discourse of 
humiliation” into “the discourse of rejuvenation” is taking place; a shift in identity from the 
“modest, victimized, developing country China” into a “confident and assertive great power 
China” is happening. At the same time, the rhetoric has gained even more cosmopolitan and – 
one could say – tianxiaist overtones.  (Mokry, 2018) 
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The main foreign policy concept of President Xi Jinping, and also the best concept to 
define Xi’s vision for the future international order, is the “community of common future for 
mankind” (人类命运共同体, renlei mingyun gongtongti, thereby CCFM)2. According to this 
idea, the international community will be more and more tightly tied together during the age of 
globalization, and all the states should let go of their grievances and concentrate on economic 
and political cooperation. Although the concept is rather vaguely described, the vision of a 
harmonious tianxia can be easily recognized as the inspiration for the concept, and Xi Jinping 
himself has described CCFM using the tianxiaist concept of “all under heaven as a one family” 
(CCTV, 2017).  
Remarkably, officially or semi-officially sanctioned Chinese scholarship which interprets 
the meaning of the CCFM usually confirms the tianxia cosmology as one of its core elements. 
For example, a recent book Building a community of shared future for mankind, whose 
publication has been overseen by Renmin University Communist Party General Secretary Jin 
Nuo, argues that the philosophical sources of CCFM can be traced to, firstly, the traditional 
Chinese tianxia worldview; secondly, to the ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics; 
and thirdly, to modern Chinese experiences in diplomacy. The book states poetically that “when 
the great way prevails, all things under heaven are shared equally and justly” and that this 
traditional ideal “communicates the Chinese sense of responsibility that goes beyond national 
boundaries” (Chen & Pu, 2017: 21).  
An article written by Jiang Shihong, a Professor of Law at Peking University, offers 
another interesting example of a semi-officially sanctioned scholarship on China’s foreign 
policy. In his article, Jiang interprets the lengthy speech given by Xi Jinping at the Nineteenth 
Party Congress held in Beijing in October 2017 in which Xi described China’s new ideology of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” (新时代中国特色社会主义思想, 
xinshidai Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi sixiang). Jiang argues that the foreign policy components 
of China’s new ideology is drawn from Marxism, but also from China’s historical tradition, 
especially from the tianxia cosmology. He goes even further by claiming that the communism 
that the party is striving to build is actually the age old Confucian ideal of the “great unity under 
heaven” (天下大同, tianxia datong) (Jiang, 2018). Marxism and tianxiaism thus seem to 
coexist peacefully in the ideology and foreign policy of China’s “new era”. 
 
2 Interestingly, the official English translation uses the word  “future”, althought the original Chinese term 命运 
(mingyun) means ‘destiny’ or ‘fate’. 
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Non-Chinese scholars such as Jyrki Kallio and Didi Kirsten Tatlow have arrived at similar 
conclusions. Kallio points out that Chinese scholars such as Jiang would not dare to “go out in 
public explaining the national leader’s thoughts” unless they had some backing from the high 
level of Chinese leadership for their ideas. Kallio thus sees tianxiaism as influencing the 
thoughts of Xi Jinping and the Communist party leadership at large (Kallio, 2018). For Tatlow, 
tianxiaist ideas are not simply a concern of rhetoric or ideology, as they are already evident in 
the actual methods and strategies of Chinese foreign policy (Tatlow 2018). 
 
Conclusions 
To conclude, it can be argued that the Chinese leadership is tapping into various different 
ideational sources as it is modernizing its great power identity. Officially sanctioned academic 
debates on China’s position in world politics are one such source, and the article argues that the 
analysis and understanding of these debates and the prevailing ideas in them forms an important 
part of illuminating the “black box” of Chinese foreign policy thinking.  
Tianxiaism can be seen as an ideational resource which is helping China’s leadership 
primarily in writing a new grand narrative of world politics – a narrative that differentiates 
China from the West and the core elements of the Western international order which China 
wants to reform. With foreign policy concepts inspired by tianxiaism, China wants to argue that 
it has always had a unique approach to world politics, and that it can thereby offer a relevant 
alternative vision for the whole of mankind. Underdeveloped, and even clumsy as a proper 
theoretical argument, tianxiaism still serves well as a powerful rhetorical device in this project 
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